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IN AID OF THE WORKING POOR: THE PROPER
TREATMENT OF PAYROLL TAXES IN CALCULATING
BENEFITS UNDER THE AID TO FAMILIES WITH
DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was enacted by
Congress in 1935' as an anti-poverty entitlement program2 designed to
provide minimum subsistence3 to impoverished children4 and their
adult caretakers. 5 For many years AFDC has also provided substantial
1. Social Security Act (Act), ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935)
(current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-615 (West 1983)). The program was known
originally as "Aid to Dependent Children." Id. § 401, 49 Stat. at 627. In 1962, the
name of the program was changed to "Aid and Services to Needy Families with
Children," and the assistance provided therein was retitled "Aid to Families with
Dependent Children." Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(1), (3), 76 Stat. 185 (1962).
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); see Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965); cf.
Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28
Stan. L. Rev. 877, 897 (1976) (There exists "a right in each person to have his basic
material needs met by his society to the extent he is unable to meet them by his own
efforts."). AFDC was one of four categorical public assistance programs created by
the Social Security Act, Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 407-08 & n.10 (1970), to
combat the effects of the Depression on those individuals historically vulnerable to
economic distress: the elderly, the blind, the disabled, and dependent children.
Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat.. 620, 620 (1935); see Schweiker v. Hogan, 457
U.S. 569, 572 & n.2 (1982); Statutory History of the United States: Income Security
ix (R. Stevens ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Statutory History].
3. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 620 (1979); E.
Durbin, Welfare Income and Employment 20 (1969); see Shea v. Vialpando, 416
U.S. 251, 253 (1974) (AFDC plans must set forth an amount necessary to maintain a
family at subsistence level); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (welfare
meets the "basic demands of subsistence").
4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a) (West 1983). For the purposes of the AFDC
program, a "dependent child" is a "needy child" under the age of eighteen "who has
been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent" and who is living in
the home of a parent or other relative. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). For the purposes of this Note, the term "caretaker"
shall be used to refer to the parents or relatives with whom the dependent child is
living.
The Act was drafted originally to assist only needy dependent children. See Burns
v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 581 (1975); Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. 620,
627 (1935). In 1950, its scope was broadened to provide financial assistance and
services to the parents or relatives with whom the child is living. Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 323(a), 64 Stat. 477, 551; see Social Security Act
Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 312(a), 70 Stat. 807, 848-49 (modification of
statutory purpose to address interests of child's parents or relatives). Under the
current Act, assistance to families expressly includes money payments needed to meet
the needs of a relative with whom a child is living. 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (Supp. V
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assistance to working families on the brink of self-sufficiency.6 For
these families, monthly welfare7 payments are not a form of guaran-
teed income8 but rather income supplements intended to protect the
worker from the vagaries of low-paying or erratic employment.9
The AFDC program is based on a system of "cooperative federal-
ism."'10 To be eligible for matching federal funds," each state must
comply with the requirements imposed by the Social Security Act
(Act)12 and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) .3
1981). Statistics indicate that 3.6 million families receive AFDC assistance, compris-
ing 10.6 million individuals. Soc. Security Bull., Feb. 1984, table M-30, at 48 (Dec.
1981 figures). Of these, approximately 7.1 million are children. Id.
6. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, A Growing Crisis: Disadvantaged
Women and Their Children 29 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Disadvantaged Women];
S. Levitan, Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1980's 35 (4th ed. 1980).
7. "Welfare" is generally understood to encompass all public assistance pro-
grams to the needy. See M. Anderson, Welfare 29-30 (1978); A. Dobelstein, Politics,
Economics, and Public Welfare 5 (1980). For the purposes of this Note, "welfare"
shall be used narrowly to refer solely to AFDC. This usage has been adopted by other
commentators. See, e.g., S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 28; Lampman, Goals and
Purposes of Social Welfare Expenditures, in Welfare Reform in America 5 (P. Som-
mers ed. 1982); Comment, The 1981 AFDC Amendments: Rhetoric and Reality, 8
U. Dayton L. Rev. 81, 82 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rhetoric and Reality].
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). AFDC authorizes cash payments to eligible
families in amounts "consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care
and protection." Id. In situations where the recipient family has no other source of
income, this payment functions as an income guarantee. R. Williams, Public Assist-
ance and Work Effort 1 (1975).
9. L. Beeghley, Living Poorly in America 82 (1983); R. Williams, supra note 8,
at 16-17; see E. Durbin, supra note 3, at 21-22; M. Sanger, Welfare of the Poor 24
(1979); Lynn, A Decade of Policy Developments in the Income-Maintenance System,
in A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs 56 (R. Haveman ed. 1977).
10. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); accord Shea v. Vialpando, 416. U.S.
251, 253 (1974) (same); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (same); cf.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (Medicaid program operates under
"cooperative federalism system") (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1980)).
11. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 79 (1979); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
316 (1968); see 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The federal govern-
ment's contribution to each state's aid package varies by state, ranging from a
minimum of 50% to as much as 78%; nationally, 54% of all AFDC benefits is paid
for by the federal government, 40 % is borne by the states and six percent added by
the localities. Solomon, Congressional Research Service, Senate Committee on the
Budget, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Benefit Adjustments in the Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC) Program, in Indexation of Federal Programs 421
(Comm. Print May 1981).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a), (b), 604 (West 1983); see King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 317 (1968); McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982); National
Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Arizona State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 449 F.2d 456,
460-61 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1976); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 530 n.1 (1974)
(quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1968)); Philadelphia Citizens in
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The states, however, are given considerable latitude in administering
their programs.' 4 Each state determines a standard of need reflecting
the estimated cost to feed, clothe and house a family of a given size at
subsistence level.' 5 It then computes a schedule of benefits based on
that standard.' Ultimately, a recipient's grant represents the differ-
ence between the state-determined need standard and the recipient's
own income,' 7 calculated according to statutory and administrative
guidelines.'"
Historically, government regulations have favored the applicant. A
working caretaker's income typically was adjusted by specified ex-
emptions and expense and incentive deductions to obtain the smallest
possible amount of statutory income for the purposes of determining
Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1982). The Department of Health
and Human Services succeeded the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) as administering agency of the AFDC program. See Department of Educa-
tion Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509, 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1982)).
14. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (quoting King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968)); see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 542 (1972);
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970). The Act was originally drafted to
maximize a state's administrative and financial independence. See Social Security
Act, ch. 531, § 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1983) ("Need standard means the money value
assigned by the State to the basic and special needs it recognizes as essential for
applicants and recipients .... "); see Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974);
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). States may establish their need standards as an itemized amount for each
expense, as several sums covering different groups of expenses, or as a single amount
reflecting the entire estimated monthly budget. Solomon, supra note 11, at 422.
16. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). A state may set benefit levels below its
need standard by, for example, imposing a benefits ceiling that is less than the need
standard or by limiting payments to a fixed percentage of an applicant's determined
need. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09 & nn.12-13 (1970); see Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473
(1970); Bourgeois v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 799, 803 (1st Cir. 1976); D. Macarov, Work
and Welfare: The Unholy Alliance 60 (1980); Solomon, supra note 11, at 423.
17. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)
(Supp. V 1981); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(A), (viii) (1983). An applicant's income
is computed on an individual basis. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. at 260; see 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983).
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1983). Income, for the purpose of deter-
mining need, is measured according to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. 1981);
specified amounts may then be subtracted from that figure under 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(8) (West 1983). Sections controlling lump sum payments, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (Supp. 1981), stepparent's income, id. § 602(a)(31), and ad-
vanced tax credits, id. § 602(d)(1), also affect the characterization and treatment of
an applicant's income. See Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d
877, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1982).
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need.' 9 Lower statutory income resulted in larger benefits20 which, it
was hoped, would provide a better quality of life for America's depen-
dent children2 1
In 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA), 22 a massive enactment designed to reduce federal spending
in nearly all areas. 23 Particularly vulnerable was AFDC's program in
aid of the working poor.2 4 In order to maximize the funds available to
the "truly needy,"2 5 Congress substantially limited the amount and
19. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a) (3) (iv) (A)
(1981) (amended 1982) (states are to exclude all reasonable working expenses from
income); id. § 233.20(a)(11)(iv) (each month states are to disregard from income the
first $30 of a working recipient's earnings plus one third of the remainder before
determining need).
20. See X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D.N.J. 1970) (purpose of
income disregards was to increase payments to recipients to reflect changes in cost of
living and to encourage work effort), modified on other grounds sub nom. Engelman
v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971) (per curiam); see also Swasey v. Whalen, 562 F.2d 831,
837 (1st Cir. 1977) (by maximizing the reductive effect of earned income, assistance
payments are reduced).
21. See Sweeney v. Affleck, 560 F. Supp. 1118, 1126 (D.R.I. 1983) (purpose of
AFDC program is to provide for the welfare of children); S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (exclude from income consideration a portion of earned income to
provide for children's future needs) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 1589], reprinted
in 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1970.
22. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
23. S. Rep. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No.
139], reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 396, 397. OBRA's provisions
were intended to cut the average annual growth of federal spending by one half
while allowing for an increase in defense spending. Id. HHS estimated that the
statutory changes to AFDC alone would produce $6 billion in savings to the federal
government within five years. 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982) (Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis).
24. Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum Summary (Apr. 14, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Budget Memorandum]. Over half of the budget cuts authorized
by OBRA affected programs designed to serve low-income families, such as those
with incomes of less than 150% of federal poverty guidelines. Id.
25. Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 389 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Bell v.
Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); see Philadelphia Citizens in Action v.
Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879 (3d Cir. 1982); S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 504,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 770-71. HHS Secretary Richard
Schweiker defined the "truly needy" as "those people who, through no fault of their
own, have no choice but to rely on Government programs for their basic needs."
Administration's Proposed Savings in Unemployment Compensation, Public Assist-
ance, and Social Services Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Assist-
ance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways & Mfeans,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981) (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary
of HHS) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Proposed Savings].
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number of income deductions available to an employed caretaker 26
and reorganized the formula used by the states to determine eligibility
and need. 27 The most significant changes affected sections 602(a)(7)28
and (a)(8)2 9 of AFDC which govern how the states ascertain and
adjust income for the purpose of determining need.30
Following the enactment of the OBRA amendments, some states
began to treat amounts mandatorily withheld from a working recipi-
ent's paycheck 31 as "income" when calculating that family's monthly
AFDC grant. 32 Consequently, payroll taxes, 33 which historically were
26. See James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1983); Philadelphia
Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 602(a)(7), (8) (West 1983).
27. See Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879-80 (3d
Cir. 1982); Nishimoto v. Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692, 693 (D. Hawaii 1983); 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 602(a)(7), (8), (18), (31) & (d) (West 1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982) (Regulatory
Impact Analysis).
28. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(7) (1976).
29. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981) with 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(8)
(1976).
30. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (A family's income
is established according to (a)(7) and income disregards are applied according to
(a)(8).).
31. These mandatory payroll deductions are also referred to as payroll taxes or
withholdings. They consist of federal income taxes that are withheld pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 3402 (1982), state taxes, municipal taxes, and Social Security or Federal
Income Contributions Act (FICA) taxes. FICA taxes provide for old-age, survivor-
ship, disability and health insurance and are withheld pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 3101, 3102 (1982).
32. E.g., Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp 1095, 1102 (D.N.H. 1983) (overturned
state practice of treating taxes as income); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 688 (W.D. Wash.
1983) (same); Nishimoto v. Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. Hawaii 1983) (same);
Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (same), aff'd sub nom.
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v.
Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 396 (D. Md.)
(upheld state practice of treating taxes as income), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga,
721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); James v. O'Bannon, 557 F. Supp. 631, 641-42 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (same), afj'd, 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F.
Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Me.) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1982). Because state eligibility for matching federal funds is conditioned on the HHS
Secretary's approval of its welfare plan, 42 U.S.C. § 604 (1976), an interpretation of
the OBRA enactments by HHS in effect dictates each state's policy relating to the
determination of income and, ultimately, need. See Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp.
at 607. In litigation, HHS has taken the position that taxes should be treated as
income. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d at 795; Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. at
388; RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. at 943. This interpretation is persuasive, however,
only to the extent that it is supported by the AFDC statute and appropriate regula-
tions. Id. States need not defer to administrative construction if it is inconsistent with
the letter or the spirit of the Act. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 411 (1979).
33. See supra note 31.
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excluded from income consideration under (a)(7),3 could now be
deducted, or "disregarded," from income only as one of a number of
work expenses 35 subject to a seventy-five dollar limit which was added
to (a)(8) by OBRA. 36 The cost of any work expenses or taxes over that
limit is therefore not taken into account in determining need, al-
though a necessary expenditure has been made. As a result, need is
measured against a larger income figure and welfare payments are
reduced, even though the recipient's disposable income has not
changed. 37
Several courts, however, have held that treating withheld taxes as
income is inconsistent with section (a)(7) of the AFDC statute which
controls the determination of income. 38 These courts reason that pay-
roll taxes are non-income items that are exempted from income under
section (a) (7) before the seventy-five dollar work expense deduction of
section (a) (8) can be taken. 39
34. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983) (payroll deductions
were "already absent" from income used to determine need), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 638
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("long-standing interpretation of 'income' as not including manda-
tory payroll deductions"); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 688 (W.D. Wash.
1983) ("income" means gross income minus payroll deductions). But see James v.
O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 796 (3d Cir. 1983) (Taxes have been deducted from gross
earnings as "personal expenses" since 1969.).
35. Work expenses include the cost of tools, materials, special uniforms, or
transportation. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983).
36. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95
Stat. 357, 843 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981)).
37. Cf. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 264 (1974) ("[Work-related] expenses
reduce the level of actually available income, and if not deducted from gross income
will not produce a corresponding increase in AFDC assistance."); Hearings on Pro-
posed Savings, supra note 25, at 90 (statement of Christine Pratt-Marston, National
Anti-Hunger Coalition) ("[OBRA's changes] would mean that women who accept
low-paying jobs but still need welfare to support their families would be made
ineligible for welfare even though their needs and circumstances have not
changed."); Danziger & Plotnick, The War on Income Poverty: Achievements and
Failures, in Welfare Reform in America 39 (P. Sommers ed. 1982) ("direct taxes are
ignored, and so the amount of income available for household consumption spending
is overstated").
38. E.g., RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Nishimoto v.
Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D. Hawaii 1983); see, e.g., Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d
1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct.
1412 (1984); Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (D.N.H. 1983); Kelly ex rel.
Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v. Gibbs,
562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
39. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub
nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634,
648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Resolution of this issue is of critical concern to Americans at or near
the poverty level. Exclusion of mandatory payroll taxes from income
consideration could mean as much as fifty or sixty extra dollars each
month for eligible families4 0- approximately ten percent of the dis-
posable income of families living at or below the poverty level. 4'
Nearly 230,000 households42 containiitg approximately 500,000 chil-
dren43 could benefit by this exemption. In view of the severe financial
40. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub
nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). In 1982, a California recipient
working full time, for a full year, at minimum wage would have had $59.52 in taxes
withheld from his or her monthly paycheck. Id. As a rule, however, the average
amount of monthly payroll deductions affecting AFDC wage-earners is much higher.
See, e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff reported
$100.53 in withholdings); Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d at 1112 (average deduction in
California is $83); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1107-08 (D. Me.) (plain-
tiffs reported monthly payroll deductions of $136.54, $62.44 and $160.02 respec-
tively), af'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). The practical effect of
including taxes as income is to reduce aid payments to working recipients by the
amounts of their payroll withholding. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d at 1111-12.
41. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1982-83, at 417 (103d ed. 1982) (annual poverty level income for
family of three was $7,250 in 1981) [hereinafter cited as Statistical Abstract]. The
poverty level is a nationally measured index based on income required to provide a
family of a given size an adequate standard of living. See id. at 417; S. Levitan, supra
note 6, at 2. The figure, updated every year to reflect changes in consumer prices and
graduated according to family size, is based on the cost of a minimum diet, trebled to
estimate a low-income family's expected cost of living. Id. In 1980, full-time employ-
ment at minimum wage paid an income of $6,448, for the entire year, well under the
$6,570 poverty level for a family of three. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at
17. Including payroll taxes as income would have a significant adverse effect on
recipient children; such a practice, therefore, is inconsistent with the goals of the
AFDC statute. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text. It has been recognized
that "[a] procedure which directly or indirectly lessens the benefits flowing to the
dependent child should not be approved." Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646, 648 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325
(1968) (paramount purpose of AFDC is to protect needy children); Smith v. Huecker,
531 F.2d 1355, 1356 (6th Cir. 1976) (same); Gardenia v. Norton, 425 F. Supp. 922,
925 (D. Conn. 1976) (same).
42. 47 Fed. Reg. 5660 (1982) (Discussion of Major Provisions and Response to
Comments).
43. In December 1981, the AFDC program made aid payments to more than
10.6 million individuals in 3.6 million families. Soc. Security Bull., Feb. 1984, table
M-30, at 48; see Statistical Abstract, supra note 41, table 559, at 343 (1979 figures).
Of this group, approximately 7.1 million were children, Soc. Security Bull., Feb.
1984, Table M-30, at 48; see Statistical Abstract, supra note 41, Table 559, at 343
(1979 figures), comprising nearly two-thirds of all AFDC recipients; see Spending
Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 217 (1981) (statement of Marian Wright Edelman, President, Children's De-
fense Fund) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Spending Reduction]. The average size
of recipient families is approximately the same for working and non-working moth-
ers, compare L. Dixon & M. Storfer, Office of Policy and Economic Research, New
York City Human Resources Administration, Trends in the Characteristics of AFDC
1984] 1177
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straits confronting the working poor, it has been recognized that "any
diminution of the income to which [the recipient] would otherwise be
entitled is an extremely important matter." 44
This Note analyzes the payroll exemption question raised by sec-
tions 602(a)(7) and (a)(8). Part I examines the demographics of pov-
erty in America. The scope, language and legislative history of AFDC
are analyzed in Part II. Part III discusses the social and economic
considerations implicit in the debate over the exclusion of payroll taxes
from income. Based on these factors, the Note concludes that manda-
tory payroll deductions should be excluded from income for the pur-
pose of determining need under AFDC.
I. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF PovERTY
Despite the federal government's continued commitment to the
goals embraced by AFDC, 45 poverty programs in America have be-
come increasingly decentralized 46 and s a consequence, susceptible
to extremes among the individual states. 47 In over half the states, the
maximum payments leave recipients needy by the states' own stan-
dards. 48 In the South, for example, where approximately forty percent
Families in New York City: 1969-1979, table 3, at 10 (67% of all AFDC cases have
one or two children) with id. at 30 (63.9% of working recipients have one or two
children). This accounts for approximately 2.2 children per case. Id. at iii. There-
fore, it can be inferred that the 230,000 households with earned income, see supra
note 42 and accompanying text, contain approximately 500,000 children.
44. Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
45. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
46. L. Greene, Free Enterprise Without Poverty 39 (1981); see S. Levitan, supra
note 6, at 17. The AFDC program is typically administered by county and municipal
agencies that often have great discretion in determining eligibility and need. See R.
Williams, supra note 8, at 40. Consequently, state AFDC programs and income
maintenance programs like it are often marred by inconsistencies, confusion and gaps
in coverage. Lynn, supra note 9, at 103.
47. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970) ("States have traditionally been
at liberty to pay as little or as much as they choose, and there are, in fact, striking
differences in the degree of aid provided among the States."); see L. Greene, supra
note 46, at 39. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
48. Solomon, supra, note 11, at 422; see Illinois Welfare Rights Org. v. Trainor,
438 F. Supp. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1977); see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
545 (1972) (states need not adhere to their standards of need in awarding benefits).
Neither the Act nor the federal regulations require states to adjust their standards of
need to reflect current prices; consequently, these need standards are often penurious
and many years out of date. Solomon, supra note 11, at 422; see S. Levitan, supra
note 6, at 30; Pearldaughter & Schneider, Women and Welfare: The Cycle of
Female Poverty, 10 Golden Gate L. Rev. 1043, 1063 & n.92 (1980). The last time
states were required by law to conform their need levels to the existing cost of living
was in 1969. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1976); see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at
542.
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of the nation's poor reside,49 families must survive on as much as two
hundred and fifty dollars per month less than families living in the
North. 50 In eight Southern states AFDC payments averaged less than
one hundred and fifty dollars a month per family.51 In contrast, many
Northern and Western states disburse an average of over three hun-
dred dollars per month to needy families, 52 and in eight of these states,
benefits exceed three hundred and fifty dollars.5 3 Consequently, the
severity of a family's poverty may depend not on its actual needs but
on the relative largesse of its domicile state.
The group most severely affected by these disparities are families
headed by women.5 4 Female-headed households, which constitute
over eighty percent of all AFDC cases, 5  have historically been left at
the lowest end of the income scale. Hampered by inadequate train-
ing,56 low market valuations of their skills,57 non-professional sex-role
49. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 41, table 732, at 443 (1979 figures). In
1979, 11,276,000 Southerners in 16 states lived below poverty level, compared to
16,107,000 in the remaining 34 states. Id.
50. Id. table 557, at 342. See infra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text. These
figures are tempered by the fact that the cost of living in the South is less than that in
the North. See id., table 769, at 468 (1982 figures) (low-income family with school
children in the Northeast could expect to spend $78.40 a week on food; in the South,
the same items would cost $73.10). This difference, however, is not sufficient to
offset the huge benefits disparities between North and South. For example, a family
living in Georgia would receive an average of $133 in monthly AFDC benefits; in
Connecticut, the same family would receive $355.
51. Statistical Abstract, supra note 41, table 557, at 342 (Alabama-$110; Arkan-
sas-$145; Georgia-$133; Louisiana-$148; Mississippi-$88; South Carolina-$107; Ten-
nessee-$113; Texas-$109) (1980 figures).
52. See id. In 1980, the national average monthly AFDC payment per family per
state was $280. Id. This figure represents the total amount of AFDC payments
received by recipient families each month from combined federal, state and local
contributions. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
53. Statistical Abstract, supra note 41, table 557, at 342 (Alaska-$359; Califor-
nia-$399; Connecticut-$358; Hawaii-$386; Michigan-$379; New York-$371; Wash-
ington-$365; Wisconsin-$366) (1980 figures).
54. See S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 4.
55. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 27; M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 19.
In New York City, female-headed families comprised 91% of AFDC recipients. L.
Dixon & M. Storfer, supra note 43, at 5; see Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note
48, at 1052-55.
56. Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 48, at 1053 & n.47; see S. Levitan,
supra note 6, at 11; R. Williams, supra note 8, at 11.
57. Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 48, at 1055, 1058; see Disadvantaged
Women, supra note 6, at 19. The concept of "comparable worth," which provides
that employees of equal value should be compensated at equal rates, assumes that
many jobs performed by women are undervalued precisely because women perform
them. Id. at 25-26; see American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. State
of Washington, 33 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 808, 819-20 (W.D. Wash. 1983);
Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, in Women and the
Workplace 168 n.100 (1976).
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socialization 58 and the demands of child rearing, 59 these women are
often locked into low-paying, blue-collar or service jobs without hope
of significant income growth. 60 For many women, therefore, AFDC
serves as a buffer against low-paying and frequently erratic employ-
ment by providing an income supplement when job earnings are
insufficient to meet their families' needs.6 1 For other women, AFDC
provides a temporary means of support until their infant children are
old enough to attend day care programs while their mothers seek
employment. 62
An individual's dependence on welfare, therefore, is not always
obviated by employment.6 3 Most AFDC caretakers not presently em-
58. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 19, 23. One commentator recently
recognized that:
Although it is true that most women today expect to work or have worked,
sex-role socialization in general and vocational preparation in particular do
not prepare women to be the primary breadwinner. Instead, the traditional
emphasis has been on jobs, rather than careers, and on making job choices
that emphasize flexibility and adaptability, rather than income potential.
Thus, women faced with the necessity of being the sole source of support for
themselves and their children are handicapped.
Pearce, Feminization of Ghetto Poverty, Society, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 70, 70-71
(emphasis in original). See generally C. Epstein, Women's Place 50-85 (1970) (discus-
sion of the causes and implications of sex typing by women themselves); Laws, Work
Aspirations of Women: False Leads and New Starts, in Women and the Workplace
33-49 (1976) (same).
59. S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 12; R. Williams, supra note 8, at 15; Lipman-
Blumen, Homosocial Theory of Sex Roles, in Women and the Workplace 20 (1976).
See generally Boulding, Familial Constraints on Women's Work Roles, in Women
and the Workplace 95-117 (1976) (history of the impact of family obligations on
women's occupational prospects). Affordable child care facilities would ameliorate
this situation, see Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 12-13, but often these
facilities are far from adequate, especially in poorer areas where they are needed
most. See Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 48, at 1054 & n.52; Sklar,
Workfare and Poor Families, America, Jan. 15, 1983, at 26, 28.
60. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 17, 20-21; S. Levitan, supra note 6,
at 11; R. Williams, supra note 8, at 16; see M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 22;
Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 48, at 1055. Forcing aid recipients to partici-
pate in mandatory workfare programs or to train for low-income jobs often has the
same effect. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 29.
61. R. Williams, supra note 8, at 16-17; see Disadvantaged Women, supra note
6, at 17; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 12; Pearldaughter & Schneider, supra note 48,
at 1085-86. Female-headed families typically cannot survive on the mothers' earnings
without some external support, at least until their general economic and social
condition changes. See Mead, The Life Cycle and Its Variations: The Division of
Roles, 96 Daedalus 871, 874 (1967).
62. See R. Williams, supra note 8, at 15. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text. In New York City, for example, nearly two-thirds of all working recipients had
no children younger than nine; 90.4 % of the mothers seeking work had no children
under the age of six. L. Dixon & M. Storfer, supra note 43, at 28.
63. Sawhill, Discrimination and Poverty Among Women Who Head Families, in
Women and the Workplace 201, 206 (1976) ("[N]o amount of work effort on the part
of female heads of families will go very far in reducing their poverty and dependence
on welfare as long as these women face such low wages in the market."); see S.
Levitan, supra note 6, at 34-35.
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ployed have worked at some time during their adult lives64 -and
would refuse welfare if they could find a job which would adequately
support their families. 65 Notwithstanding the popular representation
of welfare families as career public-aid dependents, most caretakers
turn to AFDC as a matter of necessity, not choice, and then only for
limited periods of time.66 Because every dollar from AFDC is signifi-
cant to the working poor, it is imperative that benefits accurately
reflect need. Consequently, diminishing benefits by treating taxes as
income only exacerbates conditions already engendered by intrastate
aid disparities and economic hardship.
II. THE SCOPE AND INTERPETATION OF SECTIONs 602(a) (7) AND (a)(8)
A. Scope
From 1941, when section 602(a)(7) first took effect, 67 until the
passage of OBRA in 1981, payroll taxes were routinely excluded from
64. R. Williams, supra note 8, at 16; see S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 34 (only
one-quarter of AFDC mothers have no prior work experience); M. Sanger, supra
note 9, at 21 (approximately 80% of AFDC mothers in New York City have prior
work experience).
65. D. Macarov, supra note 16, at 139; see M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 34; R.
Williams, supra note 8, at 15; Shapiro, Special Report: From Welfare to Work, Ford
Foundation Letter, Apr. 1, 1984, at 2 (quoting Marion Pines, Director, Mayor's
Office of Manpower Resources, Baltimore, Md.). An adult's decision to accept wel-
fare is usually premised on the basic economic question: "Can I keep my family fed
and healthy based on my employability and the wages I earn?" Disadvantaged
Women, supra note 6, at 29; cf. M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 26 (families may enroll
in AFDC programs to help relieve exceptional medical needs exceeding their finan-
cial resources).
66. See S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 34-35 (75 % of all welfare cases closed within
three years). In New York City, for example, the median number of years on
assistance is 2.6 years. L. Dixon & M. Storfer, supra note 43, at 39. Poverty,
generally, is not a static condition and there appears to be considerable fluctuation
between self-support and poverty, a circumstance reflected in the volatility of the
welfare rolls. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 3; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at
4; Coe, Welfare Dependency: Fact or Myth?, Challenge, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 43, 45;
Lynn, supra note 9, at 98. Often, a recipient's employment prospects and work effort
are inversely proportional to the length of her welfare dependence. See M. Sanger,
supra note 9, at 48; Pearce, supra note 58, at 74. Those who receive welfare
payments for short periods of time are more likely to be totally dependent on them, at
least until they are able to regain economic independence. L. Beeghley, supra note 9,
at 82; Pearce, supra note 58, at 74. In contrast, those whose reliance on welfare spans
years tend to use their AFDC benefits as supplements in conjunction with earnings
and other sources of income, a circumstance attesting to their marginal employability
and poor prospects for higher paying, self-supporting jobs. Id.; see L. Dixon & M.
Storfer, supra note 43, at 20, 39 (Black families tend to be dependent on welfare for
longer periods of time than either white or Hispanic recipients, but as a group they
also demonstrate a stronger attachment to the labor force.).
67. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 401(b), 53 Stat. 1360,
1379 (effective July 1, 1941) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 &
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income.68 OBRA, however, amended sections 602(a) (7) and (a) (8) and
substantially changed the way need-and income-are to be calcu-
lated. Under the statute as amended, states continue to characterize
and compute "income" pursuant to (a) (7) for the purpose of determin-
ing need;69 applicants, however, are no longer permitted to adjust
Supp. V 1981)). This enactment instructed states to take into consideration "any
other income or resources" possessed by a child-and, since 1962, that of any relative
claiming aid-for the purposes of determining need. Public Welfare Amendments of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
68. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 564 F.
Supp. 634, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 611
(N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
The exemption of payroll taxes from income was distinct from the deduction of
"expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of... income" as authorized by the
1962 amendment to § 602(a)(7). Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188; see Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). Taxes,
therefore, were deducted from income not because they were "work expenses," but
because they were not income. Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. at 614; see William-
son v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 688-89 (W.D. Wash. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F.
Supp. 933, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But see James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 796-97
(3d Cir. 1983) (Mandatory payroll deductions such as tax withholdings were work-
related expenses under pre-OBRA law.); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 391
(D. Md.) (same), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983);
Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1114 (D. Me.) (same), affd on other grounds,
692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). Courts that consider mandatory payroll deductions to
be a work-related expense rely on dictum from Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 255
(1974) ("Thus, while Colorado continued to allow individualized treatment of man-
datory payroll deductions and child care costs, all other work-related expenses were
subjected to a uniform allowance .. "). See, e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d at
796-97; Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. at 392; Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. at
1114. The dictum in Shea is weak authority, however, because of the dearth of
legislative or administrative history supporting such a conclusion and the unlikeli-
hood that the Court would have overruled the consistent interpretation of section
(a)(7) in such an off-handed manner. Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. at 612 n.6. In
any event, before OBRA, there was little need to distinguish between items that were
excluded because they were "not income" and those excluded as "work expenses"
because both were subtracted from income in full in order to calculate benefits. RAM
v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981); see 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D)
(1983). OBRA did not disturb the language instructing states to "take into consider-
ation any other income and resources" of an individual claiming aid. See RAM v.
Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1976)
with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981). As a result, interpretation of this
clause should not change because other portions of this and related subsections were
modified by OBRA. See RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 945-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Because the "income" language of (a)(7) has never been modified, subsequent
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their monthly earnings by the total amount of work expenses they
have incurred during that period. Instead, under section 602(a)(8),
the total monthly work expense deduction is limited to seventy-five
dollars of an applicant's "earned income."' 70 This limit applies regard-
less of special circumstances, the nature of the work, or disparities in
working costs among the states. 71
By separating the work expense provision, now calculated under
section (a) (8) ,72 from the determination of income, which continues to
be calculated under (a)(7), 73 OBRA caused two interpretations to
conflict. According to the federal regulations, mandatory payroll
taxes are to be excluded from "income" as determined by (a) (7),74 but
are counted as a part of "earned income" for the purpose of applying
the (a)(8) work expense disregards. 75 The treatment of mandatory
payroll taxes, therefore, hinges on its characterization either as a work
expense, subject to the seventy-five dollar limit set by section (a) (8), or
as an item previously exempted from income, governed by section
(a) (7).
amendments of (a)(7)-including OBRA-are not pertinent to the interpretation of
this language.); IA C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.33, at 191 (4th
ed. 1972) (provisions of the original act which are repeated in the amendment are
considered a continuation of the original law).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981). The subsection provides in
pertinent part: "[T]he State agency ... shall disregard from the earned income of
any child or relative applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children
... the first $75 of the total of such earned income for such month .... " Id.
Although the statute does not expressly identify the flat $75 disregard with work
expenses, it has generally been referred to as a standardized work expense deduction.
See, e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir. 1983); Turner v. Prod, 707
F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S.
Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 208, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 653, 979 (the $75 disregard is "in lieu of itemized work expenses"),
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1010, 1341.
71. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(v) (1983) (States cannot treat work expenses as a
"special need item" in order to adjust an applicant's standard of need and thereby
compensate her for expenses incurred.).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
73. Id. § 602(a)(7)(A).
74. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983). This regulation states that after all
disregards and allowances have been applied, a state in determining need shall
consider "[n]et income ... and resources available for current use." Id. Courts have
held that this regulation, and hence (a) (7) to which it refers, excludes withheld taxes
from income consideration. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564
F. Supp. 634, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 688
(W.D. Wash. 1983). But see James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d-794, 806-07 (3d Cir.
1983).
75. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983) ("[T]he term 'earned income' means the
total amount, irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax deductions,
lunches, and transportation to and from work.").
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B. Language and Legislative History of Sections 602(a)(7) and (a)(8)
1. Textual Language
The terms of the statute76 most pertinent to this analysis- "in-
come," "earned income," and the seventy-five dollar disregard in-
cluded in section (a) (8) -are not defined in the statute7 7 and therefore
are of little help in determining the proper treatment of mandatory
payroll taxes. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the legislative
history of the Act to discover its meaning and purpose.
2. Legislative History
a. Meaning of "Income"
In 1939, Congress added to the AFDC statute section 602(a)(7)
which required states to take an applicant's "income" into consider-
ation when determining need. 78 At that time, the Chairman of the
Social Security Board, Arthur Altmeyer, indicated that "income"
should comprise only those amounts actually available to the appli-
cant so that the calculation of benefits would more accurately reflect
her family's need. 79 Immediately following the enactment of 602(a) (7)
but before it was to take effect, the Social Security Board, which had
drafted the language, promulgated a regulatory policy statement reaf-
firming its position that the income used to determine need should
actually be available. 0 Accordingly, from 1941 to 1962, states rou-
76. The starting point of statutory construction is the plain meaning of the
language itself. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)); 2A C. Sands, supra
note 69, § 46.01, at 48.
77. Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v.
Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(7), (8) (West 1983); see also
James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 802 (3d Cir. 1983) ((a)(7) and (a)(8) have been
subject to different interpretations).
78. See supra note 67. The statute as originally enacted left open the possibility
that a recipient family with an employed member could realize an income in excess
of its state's standard of need. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
see Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
449 F.2d 456, 469 n.19 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
79. Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2254 (1939) (testimony of
Arthur Altmeyer, Chairman of the Social Security Board); see RAM v. Blum, 564 F.
Supp. 634, 638-39 & n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 610-
11 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
80. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1115 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted
sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984) (citing Policy Statement of Social
Security Board at 2 (Dec. 20, 1940)); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.14
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tinely exempted payroll withholdings as non-income items before de-
termining need."'
In 1962, (a) (7) was amended to allow the deduction of work-related
expenses from income . 2 When Congress replaced this open-ended
work expense provision in (a) (7) with a standardized disregard in
(a)(8) in 1981, it is likely Congress knew that withheld payroll taxes
historically had been considered non-income items.8 3 Congress' deci-
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 390-91 n.5 (D. Md.)
(same), aff'd sub nor. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983). The statement
provided first that the income must actually exist; second, it must be available to the
applicant, that is, "actually on hand or ready for use when it is needed"; third, if
converted into cash, the income must have an appreciable effect on meeting the
requirements of the applicant; and fourth, no income should be included that was
already being put to its most beneficial and necessary use. RAM v. Blum, 564 F.
Supp. 634, 639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Policy Statement of Social Security
Board at 2 (Dec. 20, 1940)). As a result of this policy, FICA taxes were immediately
excluded from (a)(7) income consideration; this rationale was later extended by
inference to allow similar treatment of mandatory income tax withholding. See
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
81. See Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 611 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert granted sub nom. Heckler
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
82. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat.
172, 188 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Congress recognized that a state's failure to reduce income in the amount of work
expenditures actually penalized a recipient's attempts at self-sufficiency. S. Rep. No.
1589, supra note 21, at 18 ("Under existing law if these work expenses are not
considered in determining need, they have the effect of providing a disincentive to
working since that portion of the family budget spent for work expenses has the effect
of reducing the amount available for food, clothing, and shelter."), reprinted in 1962
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1943, 1960. This amendment also reflected a signifi-
cant change in Congress' attitude toward AFDC recipients and a willingness to adapt
the program to accommodate the realities of modern poverty. In 1935, when the
program was first proposed, self-sufficiency of recipient families via private employ-
ment was a solution neither anticipated nor, arguably, desired. See Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1977); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1975);
see also Report of the Committee on Economic Security (Jan. 15, 1935) (the plight of
children will not be aided by employment), reprinted in Statutory History, supra
note 2, at 92; H.R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935) (recipient mother
was not considered "a potential breadwinner"; rather, her time was best devoted to
the care of her young children), reprinted in Statutory History, supra note 2, at 152.
83. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1971); 2A C. Sands, supra note 69, §
49.03, at 233; cf. S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 501 (Congress aware of
regulatory interpretations with respect to work deductions), reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 767. Congress is presumed to know of and tacitly endorse
administrative and judicial interpretations attaching to a statute when it re-enacts
that statute without change. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414
n.8 (1975). This is particularly true when Congress retains a portion of a statute after
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sion not to amend or clarify the term "income," therefore, evinces an
intent to affirm the earlier meaning, a meaning reinforced by forty
years of consistent administrative application.8 4
It has been argued, however, that this interpretation of income is
misguided: Because payroll taxes arise specifically out of earned, as
distinguished from ordinary, income, section (a)(8)-which regulates
all disregards from earned income-should control. ss Moreover, pro-
ponents of this view argue that the deliberate removal of the work
expense provision from (a) (7) and the delineation of specific allowable
disregards in (a)(8)86 indicate a congressional intent to limit deduc-
tions from a recipient's countable income to those enumerated in
(a) (8). This view, therefore, would preclude a separate exemption of
payroll taxes under (a)(7).
This position, however, fails to consider that the statutory instruc-
tions relating to the calculation of income stand alone without regard
to the administrative guidelines for computing section (a)(8)'s disre-
gards.8 7 Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history which
making significant changes in accompanying segments. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 581 (1978). Consequently, absent clear indications in the legislative history that
Congress intended to characterize payroll taxes as work expenses, it would be appro-
priate to infer Congress' adherence to the long-standing policy of excluding payroll
taxes from income consideration. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted sub noma. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v.
Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
84. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644-
45 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Such long-standing and consistent administrative interpretation
is entitled to considerable deference. EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S.
590, 600 n.17 (1981).
85. See James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 802 (3d Cir. 1983); Bell v. Hettleman,
558 F. Supp. 386, 393 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th
Cir. 1983).
86. See Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636, 639-40 (D. Me. 1983), alj'd, 728
F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 393 (D. Md.), a.J'd sub
nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F.
Supp. 1100, 1114-15 (D. Me.), aff'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982).
87. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v.
Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933,
943 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). The first part of (a)(7)
instructs states to consider income "except as may be otherwise provided in para-
graph (8)." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This clause, inserted in
1968 when the work incentive provisions of (a)(8) were enacted, Social Security
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat. 821, 881 (1968)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)), operated not
as a limitation but as an enhancement of an applicant's income by ensuring that the
(a)(8) disregards would be applied. This has no effect on the meaning of (a)(7) itself.
See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d at 1116; Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1101
(D.N.H. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. at 943. But see Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F.
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suggests that (a)(8) controls all deductions and exclusions from in-
come.8 8 The specific deductions enumerated in (a) (8) were drafted to
guarantee that they would be recognized, 9 not to prohibit indepen-
dent exemptions implicit in the ascertainment of income.9 Conse-
quently, the historical exclusion of payroll taxes as non-income items
under section (a)(7) should continue unimpaired by the application of
section (a)(8).91 This construction of "income" as used in subsection
(a)(7) is reinforced by the goals Congress hoped to achieve through
AFDC as a whole.
b. Legislative Purpose
Since its enactment in 1935, the AFDC program has encompassed
broad humanitarian purposes which have never been repudiated.
Congress' primary objective was to help states relieve the impover-
ished condition of dependent children deprived of adequate parental
Supp. 386, 393 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636, 639-40 (D. Me. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d
23 (1st Cir. 1984).
88. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983) (language instruct-
ing that (a)(8) disregards be taken before calculating (a)(7) income was added when
(a)(7) still controlled work expense deductions), cert. granted sub nor. Heckler v.
Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 1984); Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (D.N.H.
1983) (historically, (a)(8) neither supplanted nor limited application of (a)(7)); RAM
v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (application of (a)(7) remains
unchanged despite subsequent addition of (a)(8) disregards); 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981) (provision allowing states to exclude up to $1,000 of an
applicant's resources in determining need enforced independently of (a)(8)).
89. S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (work incentive disregard)
[hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 744], reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2834, 2994; S. Rep. No. 1589, supra note 21, at 18 (work expense deduction),
reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1960; see RAM v. Blum, 564 F.
Supp. 634, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The purpose of (a)(8) before OBRA was to maxi-
mize AFDC benefits available to the working poor, specifically by disregarding
certain income amounts from earnings. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see S.
Rep. No. 744, supra, at 157-58, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2994-95; Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7, at 86.
90. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted
sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp.
634, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash.
1983).
91. Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (D.N.H. 1983); see Turner v.
Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub nor. Turner v. Prod, 707
F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nor. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412
(1984).
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support.92 A second purpose, codified during the 1950's,9 3 was to strike
at the roots of family poverty by helping the parents of dependent
children achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency. 4 This
subtle shift in the program's emphasis from poverty relief to preven-
tion is evidenced by a series of policy-oriented decisions made by
Congress to assist the caretaker as well as the child.
For example, when Congress changed the program's name from
"Aid to Dependent Children" to "Aid to Families with Dependent
Children,"95 it implemented the provision authorizing work expense
disregards."6 In doing so, it implicitly recognized that welfare supple-
ments to income may be necessary to meet needs unsatisfied by a
recipient's earnings.9 7 Five years later, Congress incorporated substan-
tial work incentive disregards to encourage employment among
AFDC recipients.98 Thus, AFDC is a manifestation of Congress' belief
that government should help families with dependent children when
the private market cannot.
92. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601, 606(a) (West 1983); see Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 478-79 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313 (1968); Statutory History,
supra note 2, at 152.
93. Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 312(a), 70 Stat. 807, 848-49
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)).
94. Id. This enactment amended the program's statement of purpose by provid-
ing financial assistance "to help such parents or relatives to attain the maximum self-
support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing
parental care and protection." Id. In 1962, this purpose was further amended to
affirm Congress' commitment of public aid to the working poor: Financial assistance
would be available not only to help adults achieve economic independence but also to
"retain [the] capability" for it. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
543, § 104(c)(2), 76 Stat. 173, 186 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)); cf. Batterton
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977) (AFDC plays a significant role in relieving need
caused by unemployment.).
95. See supra note 1.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. V
1981).
97. See S. Rep. No. 1589, supra note 21, at 18, reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 1960. Because the disregard afforded by this provision and the
$75 standardized work expense deduction that replaced it are available only to
employed AFDC recipients, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(i)(I), (II) (1976 & Supp. V
1981), it is evident that Congress had anticipated that poorly paid workers with
families would qualify for and receive AFDC benefits. Moreover, the current statute
indicates that AFDC is available even to those employed full time. See id. §
602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981). In 1980, two million fully employed women earned
below minimum wage, Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 21; consequently,
Congress' provision for supplemental aid in the form of AFDC is not inappropriate.
See Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (state providing aid
supplements to recipients with outside income must likewise provide wage supple-
ments to fully employed recipients if they too demonstrate need).
98. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat.
821, 881 (1968). This provision allowed applicants to disregard the first $30 of their
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Because the statute is silent as to the treatment of mandatory pay-
roll withholdings, the expressed congressional goal in enacting AFDC
should be dispositive.0 9 The exclusion of payroll taxes from consider-
ation as income is consistent with this purpose because it increases a
working recipient's benefits in the amount temporarily withheld from
her.100 Moreover, Congress' purpose as articulated in the statute's
preface precludes any interpretation that would defeat the goals of
helping caretakers attain or retain self-sufficiency.' 10 Consistent with
these goals, payroll tax exclusion not only ensures that children will
receive benefits that more accurately represent their needs, 102 but also
provides that recipients can attain greater economic independence
without jeopardizing their children's well-being because of higher tax
rates.10 3
monthly earned income plus one-third of the remainder from the income figure used
in (a)(7) to determine need. Id. By reducing a recipient's benefits by only two-thirds
of her earned income rather than by the whole amount, thereby leaving one-third of
her earnings as an incentive to work, Congress hoped to encourage "members of
public assistance families to take employment and . . . increase their earnings to the
point where they become self-supporting." S. Rep. No. 744, supra note 89, at 158,
reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2995.
99. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)
(statutes should be interpreted in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve);
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976) (same); 2A C. Sands, supra note
69, § 45.09, at 29 (legislative purpose represents a starting point for judicial inquiry
as to the meaning of the statute). Courts have an obligation to respect the plain
meaning of a statute as revealed by its language, purpose and history even when the
appropriate administrative agency issues its own interpretation of the statute. South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979).
100. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F.
Supp. 785, 790-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); see Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); see Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689
(W.D. Wash. 1983); Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 615 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
102. RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The RAM court
observed:
In adding Section [602(a)(7) to AFDC], Congress sought to [assist needy
families] by assuring that the limited funds available would indeed be
distributed to "needy" families. Logically, the extent of a family's "need"
depends on the funds that it has available to it, ready for use to meet the
necessities of life. Certainly, mandatory payroll deductions are not, in any
sense of the word, funds that are available to an individual or his family.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
103. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see M. Anderson,
supra note 7, at 50-52 (compelling the working poor to suffer high taxes impairs their
nascent attempts at self-sufficiency). In enacting the work incentive provisions of
AFDC, Congress equated economic self-sufficiency with higher earned wages. See S.
Rep. No. 744, supra note 89, at 157-58, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
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Congressional purpose necessarily guides judicial interpretation of
the statute. 10 4 Although OBRA reforms affect the calculation of in-
come, they do not alter these fundamental goals. 0 5 Interpretation of
the newly amended sections, therefore, must not only heed
congressional intent in enacting OBRA, but also must conform to the
expressed purposes that OBRA left unchanged. 0
C. Goals of OBRA
The legislative history of the OBRA amendments reflects two broad
congressional purposes. The first purpose, manifested by the seventy-
five dollar limit on work expense deductions, embraces administrative
goals: reducing government spending, 10 7 fostering greater uniformity
of benefits among the states, 0 8 curbing falsification of expense records
and easing administrative burdens, 0 9 as well as encouraging appli-
cants to make use of all income and resources at their disposal.110
OBRA's second purpose is more philosophical: minimizing the extent
and duration of welfare dependency without endangering the "truly
needy.""ll
News at 2994-95. If, by increasing earnings, a recipient forfeits AFDC income
supplements in the amount of her increasing tax obligation, the program would
contain disincentives to work that it is likely Congress neither foresaw nor intended.
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying
text.
104. See supra note 99.
105. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 809 (3d Cir. 1983); Turner v. Prod, 707
F.2d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S.
Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 946-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see S.
Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 508 (OBRA reaffirms original goals of AFDC),
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 775.
106. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1102
(D.N.H. 1983).
107. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
111. S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 507, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 774; see Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879
(3d Cir. 1982); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 389 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom.
Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983). See supra note 25 and accompanying
text. In a statement before the Senate Finance Committee, then-Secretary of HHS
Richard Schweiker indicated five goals which the Reagan Administration hoped to
achieve by the welfare reforms to be implemented by OBRA: 1) limiting eligibility to
those most in need; 2) strengthening work requirements; 3) making AFDC a "tempo-
rary safety net" for those unable to support themselves; 4) promoting self-reliance
and individual responsiblity; and 5) improving administration. Hearings on Spend-
ing Reduction, supra note 43, at 32 (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
HHS).
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Because the treatment of payroll taxes is not specifically addressed
by OBRA, it may be inferred that Congress did not intend to alter the
long-standing practice of excluding withheld taxes from income.112 A
contrary inference, in fact, has been termed "fundamentally at odds
with the policy aims articulated in [OBRA's] legislative history."'" 3
Proponents of the inclusion view, however, rely on OBRA's underly-
ing goals to justify counting taxes as income." 4 It is necessary, there-
fore, to examine the mandatory payroll tax issue in the context of
OBRA's objectives.
1. Administrative Purpose of OBRA
a. Budgetary Impact
The foremost purpose of the OBRA-AFDC reforms is to restrain
government spending on social programs." 5 Drafters of the OBRA
legislation estimated that the federal government could save as much
as one billion dollars each year as a result of the income-calculation
changes."" Any interpretation of the OBRA reforms that would maxi-
112. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566
F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689
(W.D. Wash. 1983).
113. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see Turner v. Prod,
707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104
S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1983). In light of
the concerns embodied in the AFDC portion of the OBRA legislation, see S. Rep. No.
139, supra note 23, at 501-02 (reduce disparities among the states, simplify adminis-
tration, and minimize error and abuse), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 768, it is unlikely that Congress considered the mandatory payroll deduction
question at all when it altered the work expenses disregard provision. Kelly ex rel.
Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
114. See infra notes 115-60 and accompanying text.
115. See S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 2, 501-03, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 397, 767-69. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
The Senate Budget Committee itemized the estimated savings it hoped to achieve by
curtailing or eliminating specific aspects of the AFDC program. See S. Rep. No. 139,
supra note 23, at 501-20, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 767-87.
The largest savings arise out of adjustments affecting an applicant's statutory income,
for example: limiting earned income disregards, id. at 503 ($374 million savings in
fiscal year 1982), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 769; counting
the value of food stamps and housing subsidies, id. at 504 ($100 million), reprinted in
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 770; and considering stepparents' income in
determining need, id. at 507 ($108 million), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 773.
116. Hearings on Spending Reduction, supra note 43, at 48 (testimony of Richard
Schweiker, Secretary of HHS). The cumulative savings for fiscal years 1982 through
1984 were projected at close to $4 billion. S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, table at 19,
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mize cost savings such as counting taxes as income certainly contrib-
utes to this fiscally conservative purpose. Such an interpretation, how-
ever, is not presumptively consistent with congressional intent." 7
For example, inclusion of taxes may actually foster dependency
because the reduction of benefits in the amount of taxes not available
for use may make it more costly for a recipient to work than to rely
passively on welfare." 8 If recipients make the expected and economi-
cally rational decision to maximize gain and quit work, dependency is
actually increased."" Because no work requirement is imposed on
AFDC families containing one or more children under the age of
three,12 0 quitting work is a realistic and practical solution to the
problems caused by low wages and even lower benefits.' 2' Not only
would such a result be socially undesirable but it would also result in a
higher degree of welfare dependency and reduced government savings
in contravention of congressional purpose.12 2
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 411. The Department of Health &
Human Services estimated savings of $6 billion. 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982) (Regula-
tory Impact Analysis).
117. Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
118. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 264 (1974); Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d
1109, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct.
1412 (1984). In Turner, the plaintiff's penalty-the difference between her post-
OBRA benefits and the total for which she would be eligible if unemployed-would
be $189 a month under the payroll tax inclusion view. Id. at 1122. This penalty
attributable to taxes is widespread. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 647 n.30
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
119. See infra notes 192-93. The court in Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984), observed
that "[t]he choice is between working and not working. If the disincentive provided is
strong enough, there is no reason to believe that AFDC recipients will work in order
to pay handsomely for the privilege." Id. at 1123; see Disadvantaged Women, supra
note 6, at 28-29; cf. Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7, at 90 (discussing the impact
of OBRA's modified work incentive provisions on work effort).
120. A mother caring for a child between the ages of three and six may be
required, at the discretion of the administering state agency, to enroll in a commu-
nity work program if child care is available, S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 509,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 776, but is exempt from having to
participate in government-sponsored work incentive programs. 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(19)(A)(v) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Sanctions imposed by AFDC, 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(19)(F), relate only to individuals eligible for or registered in these work
programs. Id. § 602(a)(19)(F)(i)-(v) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Hearings on Spend-
ing Reduction, supra note 43, at 10 (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
HHS). But see Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (there is
no federally protected right of an AFDC mother to refuse employment).
121. Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 46 (statement of Rep.
Chisholm); Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 28-29; M. Anderson, supra note
7, at 50; see S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 16; Kasper, Welfare Payments and Work
Incentive: Some Determinants of the Rates of General Assistance Payments, 3 J.
Hum. Resources 86, 90 (1968).
122. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom.
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); see 127 Cong. Rec. H7137 (daily ed. Oct.
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In practice, including monthly taxes as income is untenable because
it invariably distorts the calculation of need and at times even perpe-
trates injustice. States historically have had the right to count yearly
tax refunds as income available to the applicant to reduce her need, 123
and many provide for this calculation in their AFDC rules. If payroll
taxes are also treated as income each month, the resulting hardship to
the recipient is severe. Although she actually receives the value of the
tax only once, the process of including both the monthly withheld tax
and the annual refunds as income attributes this value to her twice. 12 4
To prevent this injustice, the state could forego counting the annual
refund as income, but that solution would produce the absurd result
that monthly withholdings are counted as income although unavail-
able while the lump sum refund payment-representing cash in
hand-is ignored.125
In contrast, excluding withheld taxes from income is a more judi-
cious application of the AFDC's income calculation sections. This
interpretation comports both with case law defining tax refunds as
income 26 and with the section of OBRA requiring all states to treat
lump sum payments as income when received.127 Moreover, this inter-
7, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder). An impact report by the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that the government would lose up to 30 % of its projected savings
because of the disincentives incorporated into OBRA. See Why Welfare Rolls May
Grow, Bus. Wk., Mar. 29, 1982, at 166 [hereinafter cited as Welfare Rolls].
123. See, e.g., Vaessen v. Woods, 182 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (Cal. App. 1982);
Curry v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 965, 966, 424 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (1980); Steere v. State
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 308 Minn. 390, 399, 243 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1976); see also
Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th 1074 (1981) (general discussion). But see Kaisa v. Chang, 396 F.
Supp. 375, 377 (D. Hawaii 1975) (Tax refunds are not income for the purpose of
determining AFDC eligibility or need.).
124. See Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 688 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (having
counted taxes as income throughout the year, state may not again count as income
the tax refund); Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 615 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (the
practice of counting payroll taxes as income when withheld and again when re-
funded results in an "injustice bordering on the Kafkaesque"), aff'd sub nom. Turner
v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner,
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). HHS has recognized the injustice of this practice in the
context of tax credits. See 47 Fed. Reg. 5660 (1982) (If the amount of a tax credit is
counted each month as though it were received, it may not be counted again when it
is received in a lump sum.) (Discussion of Major Provisions and Response to Com-
ments). See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
125. The regulations expressly provide that states must treat as income any
amounts received as nonrecurring lump sum payments during that month. 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(A) (Supp. V 1981). This
provision therefore governs the characterization of a working applicant's annual tax
refund check.
126. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
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pretation produces a fairer and more accurate determination of re-
sources at relatively little expense to the government. Although reduc-
ing an applicant's monthly reported income will result in greater
federal and state spending each month in the amount of the withheld
taxes, these expenditures will ultimately be offset dollar-for-dollar
when the recipient receives her tax refund. 12 8 Consequently, exclusion
of taxes does not jeopardize the long-term cost-saving objectives of
OBRA.
b. Uniformity
A second purpose of the OBRA reforms is to foster uniformity
among the states in their treatment of AFDC recipients. 12 9 Concerned
that inconsistent and at times parsimonious interpretations of the
work expense provision in section 602(a)(7) produced inequitable
results among the states, 130 Congress instituted the flat seventy-five
dollar work expense disregard in section (a) (8) to be applied nation-
wide.13' No purpose, however, would be served by including payroll
taxes within its purview. 132
Unlike work expenses, payroll taxes cannot be inconsistently de-
ducted. 133 Withholdings for federal and Social Security taxes are uni-
128. In certain situations, the receipt of a large refund, when added to an appli-
cant's ordinary monthly earnings, will make the recipient ineligible for assistance
that month. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(A) (Supp. V 1981); 45 C.F.R. §
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983). Moreover, any portion of the refund check that exceeds
the state's standard of need when combined with other income will be carried over to
succeeding months, see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(B) (Supp. V 1981), until it no longer
affects the applicant's eligibility. See id.; 47 Fed. Reg. 5655-56 (1982) (Discussion of
Major Provisions and Response to Comments). Consequently, by not including with-
holdings as income, every dollar paid out under AFDC in the amount of the refund
will later produce one dollar in savings to the government from continued ineligibil-
ity. In cases in which the earnings and, correspondingly, the tax refund are collec-
tively lower than the standard of need, the savings all occur in the the same month,
in the form of comparatively smaller AFDC grants for that month.
129. See Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 501-02, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 768.
130. See S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 501, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 767-68; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 34 (states not uniform in
defining work expenses).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1981).
132. Congress' plan to eliminate variations among the states would in fact be
frustrated by including state and local taxes as income. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp.
634, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). This is because states imposing higher taxes will disburse
correspondingly lower benefits and thereby exacerbate existing interstate inequali-
ties.
133. See Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
State agencies can take no liberties in determining the amount of the exemption
accorded to payroll taxes because these monthly amounts are plainly indicated on the
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form nationwide, and consequently, uniform treatment of taxes
among the states existed without the seventy-five dollar standard.
Moreover, despite upholding uniformity as a goal of the OBRA re-
forms, Congress has historically been reluctant to rectify the signifi-
cant benefit-level disparities already existing among the states.
1 34 It
would therefore be inappropriate to extend the uniformity justifica-
tion to include payroll taxes as work expenses under section 602(a)(8).
c. Administrative Complexity and Fraud
A third goal of the standard seventy-five dollar work expense de-
duction is to control the fraud and minimize the administrative com-
plexity that result from the states' attempts to itemize and subtract
work expenses from income under sectioni (a)(7).135 The seventy-five
dollar disregard not only eliminates the need for a uniform definition
of work expenses, but also simplifies administration by reducing nu-
merous and unverifiable expense claims to a standard figure. Expendi-
tures for materials and services such as transportation, uniforms,
lunches and equipment were traditionally deducted in full, 136 creating
a situation that encouraged applicants to inflate their expense records
or resist prudence in spending. 137 The flat disregard directly addresses
and resolves this problem.
face of the applicant's payroll stub. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub noa. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
134. In 1979, President Carter proposed legislation that would have reduced the
inequalities in the present system by providing guaranteed minimum support from
the food stamp and AFDC programs equalling 65% of the poverty level. President's
Message to Congress on the Proposed Welfare Reform Legislation, 1979 Pub. Papers
938, 940 [hereinafter cited as 1979 President's Message]; see S. Levitan, supra note 6,
at 55. A decade earlier, President Nixon proposed reforms establishing a standardized
national minimum that states could augment but not reduce. President's Address to
the Nation on Domestic Programs, 1969 Pub. Papers 639-41, reprinted in Statutory
History, supra note 2, at 884-88. Neither reform was implemented.
135. Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 139,
supra note 23, at 501-02, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 768); see
Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd sub noa. Turner v.
Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nor. Heckler v. Turner, 104
S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
136. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 264 (1974); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F.
Supp. 1100, 1119-20 (D. Me.), aff'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d. 177 (1st Cir. 1982);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976) (states must take into consideration "any"
reasonable work expense), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981).
137. Hearings on Spending Reduction, supra note 43, at 32 (statement of Richard
Schweiker, Secretary of HHS); see S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 501 (one
purpose of $75 cap was to limit the amount of work expenses claimed), reprinted in
1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 768; Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at
28 (open-ended work expense deduction afforded no incentive to economize) (citing
John Svahn, Commissioner of Social Security).
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In contrast to these problematic expenditures are payroll taxes.
Plainly recorded on each paycheck submitted by the working appli-
cant to the welfare agency, 138 payroll withholdings are easily verified
and tabulated and give rise to neither fraud nor administrative com-
plication.13 The process of excluding taxes thus presents none of the
problems sought to be rectified by the standardized deduction. This
rationale, therefore, does not support the inference that OBRA in-
tended taxes to be included as income.
d. Earned Income Tax Credits
A fourth purpose of OBRA is to encourage applicants to exhaust all
other available resources before requesting AFDC aid. 40 A principle
resource identified by Congress is the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) 141 that eligible low-income workers are permitted to receive in
the form of pro-rated advance payments as part of their regular
paychecks. 4 2 This advanced credit, paid out as a separate item distin-
138. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub
nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984).
139. See id. (withheld amounts are easily verified and administratively uncompli-
cated); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[M]andatory payroll
deductions are paradigmatic examples of amounts that are not subject to being
falsified and are not difficult for the states to calculate.") (emphasis in original).
140. See Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 879-80 (3d
Cir. 1982); S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 503, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 769. Congress identified lump sum payments and earned
income advances as income sources with which applicants could independently
support themselves. Congress reasoned that less dependence on AFDC by individuals
with other income sources would produce a fairer allocation of scarce resources
among those truly in need. Sweeney v. Affleck, 560 F. Supp. 1118, 1125 (D.R.I.
1983) (quoting 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982)); S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 504,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 771; 47 Fed. Reg. 5648 (1982)
(Regulatory Impact Analysis).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(d) (Supp. V 1981) (earned income advance amount).
This credit was established as part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 43 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)) for the purpose of increasing a low-income worker's after-tax earnings and
thereby helping public aid recipients become self-supporting. S. Rep. No. 36, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 36], reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 54, 63-64.
142. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 105, 92 Stat. 2763, 2773-76
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3507 (Supp. V 1981)). This act modified the
earlier version of the tax credit by allowing eligible families to receive the annual sum
in monthly installments totalling not more than $500 for the year. See 26 U.S.C. §
3507(a), (c)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981) (one-wage-earner families). Congress reasoned that
"the credit can work more effectively if an individual is able to receive [the tax credit]
during the year while he or she is working. This provides the tax relief at a time when
the individual is more likely to need it." S. Rep. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52
[hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 1263], reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6761, 6815.
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guishable from ordinary tax withholding, 143 is intended to relieve low-
income families from the burden of paying heavy federal income and
Social Security taxes. 144
The EITC has been treated as earned income for the purpose of
determining public assistance eligibility and need since 1980.14" Since
the enactment of OBRA, Congress has required that the amount of the
monthly credit be treated as earned income whether or not received 146
in order to force eligible workers to apply for the tax advantage. 147
Congress' meaning is clear: The tax credit is an available resource that
must be utilized before applying to AFDC for assistance. 14
By characterizing the EITC as earned income, Congress implicitly
upheld the principle of availability as a standard for determining
need. 149 In so doing it also reaffirmed the practice of excluding payroll
143. See S. Rep. No. 1263, supra note 142, at 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6818.
144. Id. at 51-52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6814-15.
145. Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 101(a)(2)(A), 94
Stat. 194, 195 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(d) (Supp. V 1981)).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 602(d) (Supp. V 1981); S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 506,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 772.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 602(d) (Supp. V 1981); see Hearings on Spending Reduction,
supra note 43, at 33 (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS); S. Rep.
No. 139, supra note 23, at 506, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
772. Application of this seemingly harsh prescription is mitigated by the regulations
that count the monthly credits as earned income only if the working recipient
actually has access to them. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(ix) (1983). For instance, the
regulations permit a two-week grace period to allow the advanced credit application
to be processed. Id. § 233.20(a)(6) (ix) (A) (1). In situations in which no application has
been filed, the regulations require that state agencies determine whether the worker
is in fact eligible for the credits before imputing receipt to him. Id. §
233.20(a)(6)(ix)(B)(1); 47 Fed. Reg. 5660 (1982) (Discussion of Major Provisions and
Response to Comments). Likewise, if the applicant's employer refuses to issue the
credits despite the worker's efforts, the credits may not be counted as though received
that month. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(ix)(A)(2) (1983).
148. See Hearings on Spending Reduction, supra note 43, at 33 (statement of
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS); S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 506,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 772.
149. See infra note 150. In proposing the 1981 change in the treatment of ad-
vanced tax credits, the Senate Committee observed that the resulting enhancement of
earned income more accurately reflected the resources-and hence the need-of an
applicant family. See S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 506, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 772. The importance of satisfying need, in fact, underlies
many of the OBRA reforms: the imposition of a $1,000 limit on the personal re-
sources which may be excluded in determining need, id. at 503, reprinted in 1981
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 769; allocation of lump sum payments as imputed
income over a period of months, id. at 505, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 771; and counting stepparents' income in determining need, id. at 506,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 773. Hence, Congress sought to
compel AFDC applicants to draw upon their available income and resources before
soliciting public assistance. See id. at 503-07, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 769-73.
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taxes from income consideration. It defies logic to champion the
availability principle with respect to income inclusions such as the tax
credit but to repudiate it when characterizing a non-income exemp-
tion like payroll taxes.-1 0 Thus, any interpretation of OBRA that
mandates the inclusion of payroll taxes as income undermines this
theoretical justification of the OBRA reforms.
The characterization of both tax withholdings and the EITC as
income also raises the threat of counting the same tax value twice. The
characterization of federal payroll taxes as income may be rectified by
ignoring the corresponding annual tax refund,'" but FICA taxes,
accounting for as much as 6.7 percent of a worker's income,152 are not
refunded. 153 The EITC was expressly intended to mitigate the impact
150. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted
sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp.
634, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The courts deny that the OBRA Congress had intended to repeal this long-standing
principle "sub silentio." Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d at 1121; Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v.
Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. at 647.
Some courts that favor including mandatory payroll taxes in income contend that
the availability principle never applied to payroll taxes. James v. O'Bannon, 715
F.2d 794, 805 (3d Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636, 643-44 (D. Me.
1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1115
n.13 (D. Me.), aff'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). Alternately, they
contend that this principle was implicitly rejected by the administrative regulations,
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983) ("earned income" includes income tax deduc-
tions), and the Supreme Court in Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 254 (1974)
(dictum), which characterized pre-OBRA disregards as taken from gross income. See,
e.g., James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 804 (3d Cir. 1983); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F.
Supp. 386, 392 (D. Md), afj'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Me.), affd on other grounds,
692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). Because of its ambiguity, however, this dictum in Shea
is open to a contrary interpretation. See supra note 68.
The most significant modification of the AFDC program was in fact premised on
the concept of availability. In applying the $30 and one-third work incentive disre-
gard, see supra note 98, for only the first four months of a recipient's employment, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1981), Congress provided that after month five
100 % of a recipient's earned income, aside from child care and work expense costs,
would be considered in determining need. See id. Income that had been disregarded
before OBRA was now recognized as available and appropriate for consideration.
See James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 806 (3d Cir. 1983). Because Congress is
operating under the principle that available amounts should be counted as income,
the converse should also be true: If a sum, such as payroll taxes, is not available, it
cannot be considered. RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Nishimoto v. Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692, 693 (D. Hawaii 1983); see Turner v. Prod, 707
F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S.
Ct. 1412 (1984).
151. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
152. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (5.4%); id. § 3101(b)(4) (1.3%).
153. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 636, 641 (1937).
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of this withholding. 154 By counting as income both the FICA taxes and
the credit implicitly restoring it, these amounts are charged against a
recipient twice. This duplication, which has the effect of decreasing
benefits, undermines the relief aspect of the tax credit in contraven-
tion of congressional purpose.
2. Philosophical Purpose of OBRA
Many of the reforms implemented by OBRA were impelled by
philosophical considerations broader than the practical administrative
interests satisfied by the seventy-five dollar limitation on work expense
deductions. The legislative history of OBRA is replete with congres-
sional statements affirming its intent to reduce the number of working
families on welfare 55 and to diminish the benefits accruing to those
who remain.' 5 In setting forth these goals, however, Congress waS
aiming at a very specialized group of welfare recipients: the working
caretakers with "high earnings"'57 who, under an extravagant and
generally ineffectual "work incentive" provision,15 were able to disre-
154. S. Rep. No. 1263, supra note 142, at 51-52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6814-15; see S. Rep. No. 36, supra note 41, at 32, reprinted in
1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 83.
155. S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 502-03, 504, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad.'News at 768-69, 770; Hearings on Spending Reduction, supra note 43,
at 91 (testimony of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS); Hearings on Proposed
Savings, supra note 25, at 26 (testimony of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS);
see Budget Memorandum, supra note 24 (Summary).
156. S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 502, 504, 505-06, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 769, 770-71, 772; see Hearings on Proposed Savings,
supra note 25, at 3 (statement of Rep. Fortney, Chairman of Subcomm. on Pub.
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation). The consequences were harsh: Before
OBRA, working AFDC families had an average disposable income of 101% of the
poverty threshold; in 1982, the national average AFDC income wa8 81% of the
threshold. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 29.
157. See 47 Fed. Reg. 5652 (1982) (families received AFDC benefits despite "high
earnings") (Discussion of Major Provisions and Response to Comments); Hearings on
Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 11 (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
HHS) (individuals working at "high income levels" tend to stay on the rolls); S. Rep.
No. 139, supra note 23, at 502 (individuals remained on welfare although their wages
were "well above" state welfare standards), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 768; see also M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 34-35 (almost a half million
families, all earning over $15,000 a year, received an average of more than $1,300
per year from AFDC).
158. See S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 502 (since incentive was implemented,
percentage of working recipients dropped), reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 768-69; Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 26 (testimony
of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS) ("[T]he incentive we built in is such a great
incentive that everybody wants to stay in the system."). See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
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gard hundreds of dollars every month from their earned income and
thereby significantly enhance their benefits.'5 9 As Congress recog-
nized, the provision in effect encouraged dependence by individuals
arguably able to support themselves. 160
In contrast, exempting taxes from income neither encourages de-
pendency nor significantly increases government spending. Unlike the
incentive provisions which conferred large sums of money gratui-
tously, the exclusion of mandatory payroll taxes from income merely
makes it possible for a working recipient to possess the fifty or sixty
dollars a month she had earned but, because of government withhold-
ing, never received. Consequently, it would be an improper expansion
of congressional intent to interpret all the OBRA changes in the
shadow of the incentive provisions or to infer additional changes from
Congress' silence.
III. RECONCILING COMPETING POLICY INTERESTS
The OBRA amendments substantially cut back many of the welfare
perquisites available to working recipients,' 6' but did not render
working caretakers ineligible for AFDC per se. In fact, by enumerat-
ing specific disregards for work expenses and child care costs incurred
in connection with employment, Congress reaffirmed AFDC's long-
standing commitment to assist those whose earnings are too small to
achieve self-sufficiency. 162 Consequently, an applicant's "need"-the
difference between her income and the state-determined minimum
subsistence level-is essentially an income supplement provided by the
government in recognition of the low-income worker's inability to
support her family without it. 163
159. Clark v. Helms, 576 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (D.N.H. 1983); see, e.g., James v.
O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1983) ($197.90 disregarded from $588.90 gross
monthly income); Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 1983) ($273 disre-
garded from $730 gross monthly income), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner,
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1107-08 (D. Me.)
(three plaintiffs were entitled to disregard $222.21, $237.81 and $324.09 per month
respectively), af'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982).
160. See S. Rep. No. 139, supra note 23, at 502-03, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, at 769; see also Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at
26 (testimony of Richard Schweiker, Secretary of HHS) (the work incentive provision
as written encouraged people who could "move up" to maintain their dependence on
welfare).
161. See Dickenson v. Petit, 692 F.2d 177, 179-80 (1st Cir. 1983). The two most
significant changes involved the $75 cap on work expense deductions and the virtual
elimination of the $30 and one-third work incentive disregard. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
602(a)(8)(a)(ii), (iv) (West 1983); Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 63.
162. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
163. 1979 President's Message, supra note 134, at 939; see Hearings on Proposed
Savings, supra note 25, at 26 (testimony of Rep. Russo); E. Durbin, supra note 3, at
21-22; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 16.
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If excluded from income, mandatory payroll taxes would properly
have the effect of enhancing that supplement already expressly pro-
vided by statute. Although the legislative histories of AFDC and
OBRA support this interpretation, 16 4 arguments have been advanced
that would produce contrary results: 1 5 Ultimately, therefore, the
proper treatment of payroll taxes will be influenced by policy consid-
erations concerning the use of public funds in aid of the working poor.
A. Social Considerations
The propriety of excluding payroll taxes to enhance AFDC benefits
is in part contingent on the social desirability of increasing the amount
of money at the disposal of the working poor. Proponents of the use of
public assistance to supplement earned income emphasize that
AFDC's primary purpose is to protect all eligible families from the
social, physical and emotional distress of poverty. 166 If withheld taxes
are treated as income for the purposes of reducing this supplement
even though that "income" is unavailable to the worker, poverty is not
alleviated but rather made worse. This result would frustrate AFDC's
statutory and historical mandate.
Those who favor reducing welfare payments-and by extension,
counting taxes as income-perceive government's obligation to the
poor differently. They argue that government must not be the instru-
ment of perpetuating the poverty of low income workers through
income guarantees.6 7 Public aid should be reserved for those with no
prospects of employment; 68 those who can work must do so and
164. See supra notes 78-160 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Dickenson v. Petit, 728 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1984); James v.
O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 810 (3d Cir. 1983); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386,
393-95 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983).
166. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (welfare aids recipients in
time of "brutal need") (quoting trial court). Supplements not only make labor more
profitable than welfare dependence by raising the family's standard of living, but by
rewarding involvement in the work force they also ameliorate the alienation-social
as well as economic-that characterizes the poor and sets them apart as an isolated
and scorned "underclass." See Lodge & Glass, The Desperate Plight of the Under-
class, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1982, at 60, 62.
167. G. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty 122 (1981); see M. Anderson, supra note 7, at
50. It is argued that the welfare system, in straining to provide subsistence for all, in
fact traps the poor in their condition:
The most serious fraud is committed not by the members of the welfare
culture but by the creators of it, who conceal from the poor, both adults and
children, the most fundamental realities of their lives: that to live well and
escape poverty they will have to keep their families together at all costs and
will have to work harder than the classes above them. In order to succeed,
the poor need most of all the spur of their poverty.
G. Gilder, supra, at 118.
168. See M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 68-69, 159; G. Gilder, supra note 167, at
119; H. Hazlitt, Man vs. The Welfare State 218 (1969).
1984] 1201
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
accept the wage their services will claim on the market. 69 Thus,
individuals who have demonstrated the capacity for self-support must
not be permitted to rely on their AFDC checks for the income advan-
tages otherwise attainable through hard work.1 70 Supplementing in-
come with AFDC, even in the amount of excluded payroll taxes,
therefore, merely prolongs dependence and retards upward economic
mobility. 17 1
This argument, however, ignores the economic realities that inhibit
an adult recipient's potential for self-advancement and that probably
forced the recipient to apply for public assistance in the first place. A
working caretaker caught between the demands of childrearing and
the limits of her skills may not realistically be expected to work any
harder to improve her condition. 72 The bootstrap policy underlying
the inclusion view, therefore, gives poor workers no more than they
already have and does little to alleviate welfare dependence.173
In view of the public's presumed resentment of the welfare sys-
tem, 74 another consideration weighing against income supplements is
political expedience. An AFDC recipient who qualifies for and re-
ceives all available non-cash benefits is likely to have a higher income
than an unsubsidized low-income worker.175 By permitting her the
169. See H. Hazlitt, supra note 168, at 68-69 (disapproval of a situation in which
an individual would leave a low-paying job to rely on guaranteed income from the
government).
170. See G. Gilder, supra note 167, at 116-17.
171. See M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 50; G. Gilder, supra note 167, at 122; M.
Sanger, supra note 9, at 40.
172. See D. Saks, Public Assistance for Mothers in an Urban Labor Market 74-75
(1975); M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 30. The presence of young children in a poor
household has a negative effect on the mother's earning capacity, S. Levitan, supra
note 6, at 12; see M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 24-25, and her responsiveness to
changing market conditions, D. Saks, supra, at 74. See supra notes 56 & 59 and
accompanying text. Consequently, by providing supplemental or total aid whenever
a woman's family commitments impair her earning capacity, the government per-
forms a necessary as well as productive service: "[T]his kind of return to welfare
should not be seen as a failure to achieve self-support but more as a successful way for
government to contribute to family support when most needed, without interfering
with the individual's motivation to work whenever possible." E. Durbin, supra note
3, at 22.
173. See E. Durbin, supra note 3, at 94; M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 40-41;
Sawhill, supra note 63, at 206.
174. Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 6 (statement of Richard
Schweiker, Secretary of HHS) ("The American people strongly oppose assistance
going to those who can work, those who have other sources of income, and those who
get as much or more on welfare as others get from working."); Lynn, supra note 9, at
100 ("middle-class resentment of excessive favoritism [that is] shown to the welfare
population"). See generally M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 59-65 (discussion of public
attitudes toward welfare); D. Macarov, supra note 16, at 136-46 (same).
175. See Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 30 (testimony of Rep.
Rousselot); M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 33; Sobel, Welfare & the Poor, in Welfare
& the Poor 2 (1977) (quoting Sen. Humphrey).
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additional boon of enhanced welfare benefits in the amount of ex-
cluded taxes, "taxpayers end up paying not only their own taxes, but
subsidizing the payment of federal income and social security taxes for
employed recipients."'1 6 The result is a situation which arguably re-
wards laxity and punishes hard work.
This perception of public outrage over the alleged qver-compensa-
tion of public aid recipients may be exaggerated. Non-welfare, lower-
income families who supposedly benefit from the reduced tax rates
made possible by severe welfare cuts are themselves in constant risk of
economic hardship. 177 It is more likely that they would object to the
substantial tax breaks afforded the wealthy than gainsay meager gov-
ernment assistance disbursed to those even worse off than they.17
The policy arguments underlying a decision to count taxes as in-
come may often be based on an unrealistic estimate of an aid recipi-
ent's ability to work and thus lift herself out of dependency.179 To
deny her an income equal to that of the non-worker would contravene
the very purpose of AFDC, which is to provide "a reasonable subsis-
tence compatible with decency and health."''8 0 This goal is certainly
176. Message by Governor Reagan to the California Assembly (Mar. 3, 1971),
reprinted in I Center of Social Welfare Policy & Law, Materials on Welfare V-95
(1972); see H. Hazlitt, supra note 168, at 70 (government can give only that which it
has taken from someone else).
177. See Coe, supra note 66, at 45 (25% of the American public received public
assistance during 1969-1978). This suggests that no demographic group "is immune
from an occasional bad year which temporarily forces him or her to turn to welfare
in order to make ends meet." Id. at 46; see Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 3
("between one-third and one-half of the poor in a given year are not poor the
following year"); see Williams, The View from $204 a Week, Newsweek, Jan. 18,
1982, at 15 (rebutting government contention that non-welfare, low-income workers
support public aid cuts). Williams asserts:
What the people "up there" don't understand is that I identify with, the
beneficiaries of these programs .... "There, but for the grace of God go I."
So far, I have never had to rely on welfare, free lunches or Medicaid, but I
very well might someday .... People like me, who live only a hairbreadth
from economic disaster, are glad those programs are out there, though we
pray we'll never have to use them. We feel sympathy for the ones who do.
Id.
178. See Hearings on Proposed Savings, supra note 25, at 46 (statement of Rep.
Chisholm) ("Not only are our present benefits inadequate, but the administration's
proposals are the equivalent [of] increasing the tax rate on the earnings of the
working poor at a time when tax cuts are advanced for more well-off workers."); cf.
Justice Dangles in Limbo, Time, Apr. 9, 1984, at 27 ("[The Reagan Administration]
points to $100 cases of welfare abuse. Then they claim to see nothing wrong about
misusing Government perks worth thousands of dollars.") (quoting Larry Patton,
aide to Sen. Proxmire).
179. See M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 39-40; Sawhill, supra note 63, at 206; see also
E. Durbin, supra note 3, at 94 (New York City survey indicated 'that welfare
recipients would not earn amounts equal to their public assistance income).
180. H.R. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(c) (1935), reprinted in Statutory
History, supra note 2, at 100; see 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
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better achieved by allowing the working poor the fifty or sixty extra
dollars a month made possible by the tax exclusion than by the theo-
retical comfort of political expediency or hard work.
B. Economic Considerations
In addition to its short-term role as the source of supplemental
monthly income for millions of households, AFDC also attempts to
assist the poor in attaining economic self-reliance.' 8 ' The economic
considerations suggested by the payroll tax debate, like those accom-
panying social analysis, focus on the proper role of government in
freeing the needy from poverty. These considerations address the
importance of instilling the work ethic in employable AFDC recipi-
ents, the impact of disincentives fostered by smaller grants to working
recipients, and the capacity of private industry to accommodate the
working poor while paying a subsistence wage.
One rationale for including payroll taxes as income arises from the
oft-repeated notion that the poor need "the spur of their poverty" to
escape their condition.'8 2 By inflating income with tax withholdings,
an administrative agency can reduce cash supplements or terminate
welfare eligibility altogether for many working recipients. 183 In the-
ory, as their government-provided income source dries up, the near-
poor will rely more on their own devices to make up the lost in-
come. 184
This rationale is unsatisfactory, however, because associating depri-
vation with the work ethic oversimplifies the motivation factor with-
out addressing the poor's basic needs. Although only approximately
fourteen percent of all AFDC recipients are employed,'8 5 nearly three-
181. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 544 (1972).
See supra note 94.
182. G. Gilder, supra note 167, at 118; see H. Hazlitt, supra note 168, at 80-81.
183. See, e.g., Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 1983) (45,000
AFDC families in California affected), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner,
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Kelly ex rel. Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 788
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (4,420 stepparent households in New York State affected); RAM v.
Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 937-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (10,000 families in New York City
affected).
184. Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax: Would It Discourage Work?, Monthly
Labor Rev., Apr. 1981, at 23, 26. Following an eight-year, government-sponsored
study of the economic effects of alternately raising income guarantees or reducing
benefits, Moffitt concluded that benefit reduction promoted work effort in female
householders by inducing them to make up in earnings the benefit income they had
lost. Id.; see M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 43 (disincentives are created by higher
welfare payments).
185. Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 28 (nearly 9% employed full-time
and over 5% part-time); see Kasper, supra note 121, at 90 (up to 10% of public
assistance recipients may use the benefits to supplement inadequate earnings from
full-time employment).
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quarters of all caretaker adults have prior work experience.' 86 More-
over, most employable adults' 87 are employed, in training or actively
seeking work.'8 Arguably, the presence of many previously employed
adults on welfare suggests not their lack of motivation, to be cured by
deprivation,' s9 but rather their own lack of skills and the inadequacy
of the market that government expects to absorb them. 190
Moreover, the same reductions that heighten work effort simultane-
ously represent massive work disincentives as long as the government
maintains generous public assistance programs for the non-working
poor.'" Because a worker faces a reduction in total income available
to meet family needs as the cost of employment rises,'9 2 the recipient
who attaches no particular utility or disutility to welfare dependency
will invariably choose the economically sensible path: abandon work
altogether in favor of a more profitable dependence on welfare. '3 Not
186. See supra note 64.
187. Generally, any adult who is not disabled or needed in the home is considered
employable. See L. Dixon & M. Storfer, supra note 43, table 12, at 20; S. Levitan,
supra note 6, at 11; R. Williams, supra note 8, at 15.
188. See L. Dixon & M. Storfer, supra note 43, table 12, at 20; D. Macarov, supra
note 16, at 65; Shapiro, supra note 65, at 2, 2-3; see also S. Levitan, supra note 6, at
34 (one-third of all AFDC recipients are working or seeking work); M. Sanger, supra
note 9, at 31-36 (recipients uphold work ethic and importance of self-support).
189. See D. Macarov, supra note 16, at 127-28; M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 35; R.
Williams, supra note 8, at 15; Sawhill, supra note 63, at 206.
190. See Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 63; E. Durbin, supra note 3, at
20; Lodge & Glass, supra note 166, at 71. Ultimately, the employable poor's depen-
dence on welfare reflects the mutual incompatibility of the worker and the market
for her services: Government intervention in the form of individual economic assist-
ance is therefore appropriate when normal market mechanisms fail to distribute the
society's resources adequately throughout the population. A. Dobelstein, supra note
7, at 17-18; see N. Gilbert, Capitalism and the Welfare State 4-5 (1983).
191. See M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 47 ("People on welfare may be poor, but
they are not fools."); M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 40-43 (welfare system may reduce
incentives to work). Since 1963, AFDC income has increased at a much faster pace
than earned income. See S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 33. This factor, in conjunction
with the fact that a recipients benefits are contingent on the amount of her earnings,
may ultimately render labor participation unprofitable. See M. Sanger, supra note 9,
at 43-46; R. Williams, supra note 8, at 21; Orr & Skidmore, The Evolution of the
Work Issue in Welfare Reform, in Welfare Reform in America 174 (P. Sommers ed.
1982). Consequently, total or partial dependency on public aid looms as a permanent
economic reality, even in situations where the poor are on the brink of self-sufficiency
by their own labor.
192. Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7, at 93. The $75 limit on work expense
disregards, coupled with a policy of counting taxes as income, depletes a worker's
resources without a corresponding increase in benefits. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416
U.S. 251, 254-57 (1974).
193. R. Williams, supra note 8, at 34; see M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 47; E.
Durbin, supra note 3, at 10; M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 40. Ordinarily, the decision
whether to forego earned income in favor of public dependency is based on a
comparison of values assigned respectively to work, leisure, and the ability to enjoy
1984] 1205
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
only would such a result contravene Congress' intent to reduce total
and perpetual reliance on AFDC, but it would also obstruct the
inherent, non-monetary advantages of employment: enhanced dignity
and. self-esteem, 9 4 expanded opportunities for self-advancement 195
and the creation of a positive role-model for children. 96
The role of private industry in providing job opportunities at rea-
sonable compensation also affects economic policy considerations.
Substantial reliance on AFDC by the working poor, particularly
women, suggests that the market economy alone is incapable of guar-
anteeing subsistence level income.197 Industry's low valuation of poor
women's marketable services, 19 coupled with the political and eco-
nomic inexpediency of continually raising the minimum wage, 9
increased consumption of market goods and services without cost. See R. Williams,
supra note 8, at 21. A female head of the family must consider an additional factor:
the financial as well as personal cost involved in delegating her domestic and child
care duties to another while she works. See D. Saks, supra note 172, at 17. Thus, the
inherent disincentives contained in AFDC payments are aggravated when applied to
women. The practice of imposing yet another cost-the cost of taxes withheld from
earned wages-tips the balance even farther toward complete dependency.
194. See E. Durbin, supra note 3, at 10; D. Macarov, supra note 16, at 127; M.
Sanger, supra note 9, at 33; Orr & Skidmore, supra note 191, at 168.
195. Note, AFDC Work Incentive Anomaly, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 934, 940 (1980);
see S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 35 (welfare alone rarely adequate to lift a family out
of poverty); see also D. Macarov, supra note 16, at 106 (employment is the only
socially sanctioned method of sharing society's resources). Moreover, regular partici-
pation in the work force fosters the confidence necessary to weather occasional
employment setbacks. See M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 33.
196. See M. Anderson, supra note 7, at 89 (parent's rational decision to accept
public aid rather than work may have an adverse effect on the morals and attitudes
of their children).
197. See E. Durbin, supra note 3, at 20; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 34, 128; D.
Saks, supra note 172, at 1; see also M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 37 (correlation
between having a low-paying or "bad" job and the extent of a working recipient's
welfare dependency).
198. See Disadvantaged Women, supra note 6, at 20; Vladeck, Comparable
Worth, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 1110, 1112-13 (1984). The lowest wages are invariably
associated with typically female occupations, such as service or clerical jobs. Disad-
vantaged Women, supra note 6, at 21. Moreover, training programs have not been
particularly helpful in augmenting the earnings of low-skill workers. See Haveman,
Introduction: Poverty and Social Policy in the 1960s and 1970s-An Overview and
Some Speculations, in A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs 17 (R. Haveman
ed. 1977); Lynn, supra note 9, at 116.
199. See S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 130-32; Rottenberg, Introduction, in The
Economics of Legal Minimum Wage 3-5 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1981). Although the
minimum wage guarantees a higher standard of living for its recipients, its rapid
adjustment can exert downward pressure on non-regulated wages, F. Piven & R.
Cloward, The New Class War 19-20 (1982), discourage greater employment, E.
Durbin, supra note 3, at 17; S. Levitan, supra note 6, at 130, and even contribute to
inflation by increasing service and manufacture costs. Id. at 131; D. Macarov, supra
note 16, at 76; Leffler, Minimum Wages, Welfare, and Wealth Transfers to the
Poor, 21 J. of Econ. & Law 345, 346 (1978); see Rottenberg, supra, at 4-6.
1206 [Vol. 52
PAYROLL TAXES UNDER AFDC
forces government to maintain its active role in helping to reintegrate
the underclass into the private sector.200
Government involvement in safeguarding the economic well-being
of AFDC recipients also helps reestablish them within the social201 and
political 02 mainstream. By supplementing low wages with public aid,
the government creates a system under which the poor acquire an
interest in both the market that employs them and the government
that compensates them for the market's deficiencies. 20 3 For this rea-
son, it has been recognized that "[a] structure of public entitlements
can do what private property alone cannot do: it can give everyone a
stake in the stability and success of the social system. '20 4
In a small but significant way, the exclusion of payroll taxes from
income functions as an income supplement of low-wage labor. En-
hanced benefits serve as a buffer against the vagaries of market com-
pensation and demand and at the same time allow industry to pur-
chase inexpensive labor without being morally or legally compelled to
pay a higher wage. The government, meanwhile, reaps the advan-
200. See A. Dobelstein, supra note 7, at 228-30; L. Greene, supra note 46, at 122;
see also Lynn, supra note 9, at 116 (income supplements may be necessary to reduce
the gap between earnings and poverty); cf. Haveman, Direct Job Creation: Poten-
tials and Realities, in Welfare Reform in America 194, 195 (P. Sommers ed. 1982)
(direct job creation in the form of employment subsidies will reduce industry's cost of
employing low-wage labor while assuring the worker of an adequate income). It was
recently suggested that industry can help assimilate the low-income or erratically
employed worker into the work environment, but not without federal funds. Lodge
& Glass, supra note 166, at 70-71. Business has neither the resources nor the ability to
take on the task of reintegrating the underclass alone or to replace the billions of
dollars cut from federal social programs. Id. at 71. Although business is willing to
increase its voluntary action, "the federal govenment cannot abandon the task of
either defining the goals or marshalling the resources." Id.; see Welfare Rolls, supra
note 122, at 166 (role of. business in helping the working poor).
201. See D. Macarov supra note 16, at 127; M. Sanger, supra note 9, at 33; Lodge
& Glass, supra note 156, at 62.
202. See Walzer, Politics in the Welfare State Concerning the Role of American
Radicals, in Beyond the Welfare State 150-51 (I. Howe ed. 1982); see also Howe,
Introduction, in Beyond the Welfare State 11 (1982) (affords recipient greater aware-
ness of rights and needs).
203. This interrelationship may actually benefit industry more than the poor by
reinforcing the low-wage market, see F. Piven & R. Cloward, Regulating the Poor
124-26 (1971), by pacifying a potential source of economic and political militancy,
see N. Gilbert, supra note 190, at 3; F. Piven & R. Cloward, supra, at 198;
Achenbaum, The Formative Years of Social, Security: A Test Case of the Piven and
Cloward Thesis, in Social Welfare or Social Control? 68 (W. Trattner ed. 1983), and
by providing a market for its products; see D. Watson, Demand, in Encyclopedia of
Economics 232 (D. Greenwald ed. 1982) (increase in consumer's income may pro-
duce rise in product demand).
204. Will, In Defense of the Welfare State, New Republic, May 9, 1983, at 21, 24;
see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
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tages of increased employment and decreased welfare dependency.
Such cooperation between the private and the public sector on behalf
of the low-income worker, therefore, inures to the benefit of all.
CONCLUSION
Already handicapped by inadequate job skills, low wages and er-
ratic employment, America's working poor sustained an additional
blow in 1981 when the social spending cuts authorized by OBRA took
effect. Most severely affected were women with young children who,
in their struggle to escape poverty, frequently accepted AFDC bene-
fits to supplement their low and undependable earnings. For these
women, the decision to accept public assistance signifies not indolence
but rather the realization that they cannot provide for the subsistence
needs of their families on the strength of their own hard work. Treat-
ing payroll taxes as income, therefore, deprives working recipients of a
necessary earnings supplement and reduces the benefits available to
their children. As a result, a woman striving for economic indepen-
dence may be forced to surrender totally to the welfare system.
Any interpretation of the AFDC program which permits these
results undermines the long-standing goals of AFDC: to provide for
the proper care of children and to encourage self-sufficiency of their
parents. Consequently, mandatory payroll deductions should not be
treated as income because to do so would not only threaten the
welfare of America's impoverished children but would virtually assure
the continued poverty of America's working poor.
Carol Ann Siciliano
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